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2Legalized gambling is being promoted as the economic development tool of the
1990’s. All across America, communities are embracing an industry once relegated to
the back rooms of seedy establishments run by shady characters of questionable moral
standing. This new-found respect for gambling comes as a result of promised economic
benefits and financial rewards that gambling can bestow upon communities, especially
those that are economically distressed. Communities in need of an economic shot in the
arm see gambling as a key industry that can solve a significant part of their economic
ills. Other reasons that communities seek “quick-fix” economic solutions rather than
long term economic development alternatives are related to the nature of our political
system and the plight of central cities. Because local and state politicians are elected for
only a short time, they believe they must show “significant progress” if they are to get
reelected. In addition, many run on a platform of “no new taxes.” These perspectives,
plus the erosion of the local tax base due to the decline of the middle class in central
cities, have caused elected officials to think in more desperate ways to solve their
economic problems.
This was the case for New Orleans. Still suffering from the oil bust of the mid-
1980's, New Orleans looked to its tourism industry as a means of bolstering its
economy. While the tourism industry saw dramatic growth in the last ten years, New
Orleans’ economic outlook was still poor. With the promise of job creation, tax revenue
generation and the fulfillment of broad economic objectives, New Orleans hailed casino
gambling as a panacea. Casino experts predicted that the introduction of gambling, as
an adjunct to the city's burgeoning tourism industry, would be a win-win situation for
all parties involved. So with hopes running high, and with very little planning, New
3Orleans plunged headlong into the casino maelstrom. After nearly two years of
legalized gambling, the city of New Orleans is learning some important lessons. The
impact of casino gambling on the city's economy has not been anywhere near what was
anticipated, and the expected economic fallout in terms of economic development and
reinvestment has not materialized. 
What happened? The economics of gambling is a complicated system that makes
assumptions about society as a whole and about a city in particular. When these
assumptions prove incorrect, the promise of economic salvation is much more difficult
to carry out. 
The purpose of this paper is to chronicle the city of New Orleans’ experience
with casino gambling and examine some of the factors that have proven critical in
determining the overall economic, social and political failure of the industry.  The
experiences of New Orleans are not unique, unfortunately, and should serve to
enlighten other communities considering legalized gambling to the potential problems
that can occur.
Casinos Open to Rough Waters in New Orleans
With the passage of state legislation in 1992, New Orleans became the first major
American city outside Las Vegas and Atlantic City to house a land-based casino.
Riverboat gaming had been approved the previous year. Having successfully developed
its tourism trade into a $2.55 billion industry, New Orleans was faced with the
complicated task of integrating the casino business with the tourism business. Casino
proponents were confident that New Orleans’ estimated nine million tourists annually
4were an untapped market and that many of them would flock to the casinos if they were
in their midst. This has not been the case. After nearly two years of legalized gambling,
the casino industry is having a tougher time establishing itself than many people
expected. 
The Star Casino was the first riverboat casino to open in New Orleans on the
south shore of Lake Ponchartrain. It opened in late 1993, but departed New Orleans in
March 1994 when its owners lost a legal battle over the boat’s authority to conduct
dockside gambling (Gray 1995). Bally's Belle of New Orleans quickly berthed itself at
the Star Casino's location at South Shore Harbor, hiring nearly all of the Star's
employees. Its revenue picture appears to be profitable at this stage.
In March 1994, the Hilton Hotel, located on the Mississippi River in downtown
New Orleans, opened its riverboat casino, the Queen of New Orleans. It proved to be
moderately successful with average monthly revenue of $5.7 million. This prompted
the Hilton Hotel to replace it within just a few months with a larger boat, the Flamingo
Casino. The Flamingo initially enjoyed casino revenues in excess of $7 million per
month.  However, as more casinos opened in and around New Orleans, casino revenues
declined to a monthly average of $5.3 million. In May of 1995 the Flamingo laid off
fifty workers. The increased competition coupled with a slow summer tourism season
prompted the Hilton Hotel to put the Flamingo Casino up for sale in September of
1995, with the intention of replacing it with a smaller riverboat. The Queen of New
Orleans, which had been sitting idle at the New Orleans Industrial Canal since it was
taken out of service was returned to the hotels riverfront dock.
5The repeated refusal of the riverboat casinos to conduct regularly scheduled
cruises has generated great deal of controversy.  Currently, state law requires that
riverboat casinos make ninety minute cruises every three hours, barring dangerous
weather conditions. Since riverboat casinos make more money when they stay
dockside, critics have accused the floating casinos of devising ways to avoid cruising.
For more than a year New Orleans riverboat casinos have used reasons such as
darkness, submerged objects, crabtraps and glare from shore lights as reasons for not
cruising.  In mid 1995, the State Police, who have been sharply criticized for not
aggressively enforcing the cruising law, began issuing violation citations to those boats
that used excuses deemed unacceptable by the State Police. While attempts by the
riverboats remain dockside have decreased, the problem with questionable reasons for
not sailing still exists.
The mandatory cruising requirements have also presented other problems for the
floating casinos. Many gambling patrons, unhappy with the idea of having to leave
shore to gamble, often choose to go to the temporary, land-based casino downtown or
to make a short drive (45-90 minutes) to the Mississippi Gulf Coast to one of the many
dockside casinos there.  Since Mississippi permits dockside gambling,  the casino
visitors are able to come and go freely.
As more casinos continued to open in and around New Orleans, coupled with the
glut of casinos on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, it appeared that the regional gambling
market had reached the saturation point. This was never more apparent than with the
collapse of the River City Casino complex. In April of 1995, the River City Casino
complex opened with a spectacular debut. As a joint venture between Hemmeter
6Enterprises and Capital Gaming International, the River City Casino complex boasted
two riverboat casinos, Hemmeter's Grand Palais riverboat and Capital Gaming
International's Crescent City Queen. The River City Casino complex was built at a cost
of $223 million in an aging industrial area just upriver from the Ernest N. Morial
Convention Center in downtown New Orleans. After just nine weeks, the entire
complex, having lost $8 million, ran out of cash and closed. The closure of the River
City Casino Complex eliminated 1,800 jobs and left $30 million in unpaid bills to
suppliers and tax obligations to government agencies (Donze 1995).
Problems With the Temporary Land Based Casino
About the same time the River City Casino complex debuted, Harrah's temporary
casino opened with much ballyhoo. In the first month of operation, casino revenues
were a dismal $11.2 million, substantially lower than the Harrah's projection of $33
million (Hughlett 1995). As the summer months dragged on, casino revenues showed
slight increases though still far less than expected. June casino revenue increased to
$13.2 million, followed by a slight increase in July to $14.8 million. However, after two
months of gains, August saw a drop in casino revenue to $13.1 million (Hughlett, "Soft
Summer..."1995). Casino experts anxiously awaited the fall tourism and convention
season that many felt would increase casino business. However, critics pointed out that
studies showed conventioneers were not likely to go to casinos. While conventioneers
tend to be in upper middle income levels, the majority of avid casino gamblers fall into
the middle and lower-middle income levels. Additionally, with the presence of some
form of gambling now in forty-eight states, it is not an experience unique to New
7Orleans. As a result, many tourists have proven indifferent to participating in gambling
(Bowser 1995). While Harrah's maintained that the increased tourism associated with
the fall season would help the casino meet the original revenue predictions of $33
million per month, most analysts felt that monthly revenues in the area of $20 million
were more realistic. The poor performance of the temporary casino however, did not
go unnoticed by Harrah's officials. They considered the possibility that the permanent
casino might not generate the revenue expected. Stock analysts with Salomon Brothers
forecasted that the permanent casino would make about $398 million in its first full
year of operation. These figures were substantially lower than the $658 million
originally projected by Harrah's. At an August investors’ meeting sponsored by
Salomon Brothers ,  Chuck Ledsinger ,  Chief  Financial  Off icer  for  Harrah 's
Entertainment, told investors that, while Salomon's forecasts were conservative, for the
purposes of discussion they were a good starting point (Hughlett, "Expectations..."
1995).
While it seemed that revenue generated by the temporary casino was enough to
pay its own bills, it became a matter of concern as to whether or not enough revenue
would be generated to allow for the completion of the permanent casino. Completion
was contingent upon the availability of $72 million in casino revenue to be generated
by the temporary casino. However, according to documents filed with the Federal
Securities and Exchange Commission in August, "no cash flow will be available from
the temporary casino" (Hughlett, "Harrah's needs..." 1995).  If the temporary casino
would be unable to supply the additional $72 million, investors in the permanent casino
8would be required to develop some creative financing options to supply the needed
capital.
In mid-August, with revenues and attendance far below predictions, Harrah's was
forced to shut down nearly 20 percent of its gambling space in the temporary casino and
cut 15 percent of its 3000 employees, many of whom were hired as part of the
employment quota (i.e., women/minorities from New Orleans). Many of those fired had
been beckoned by Harrah's promise of well-paying jobs with opportunities for
advancement in the future. Having given up other jobs to take positions at Harrah's,
many of those fired found themselves without much hope of obtaining another job in
New Orleans’ depressed economy. Many were forced to file for unemployment. While
Harrah's pledged to rehire the terminated employees when business picked up, a stock
analyst with Hancock Institutional Equity Services in Los Angeles doubted that
Harrah's would “...bring back many, if any, of the people until they get the permanent
site open” (Hughlett, "Optimists Back..." 1995).
While Harrah's cited the traditionally slow summer tourism season as one reason
for the casino's poor performance, a general lack of appeal towards gambling on the
part of tourists would appear to explain the poor attendance figures. A study conducted
at that time by the New Orleans Metropolitan Convention and Visitors Bureau showed
that only 24% of visitors surveyed expressed interest in gambling even though 56%
knew about the casino in New Orleans (Yerton 1995). People travel to New Orleans to
experience its unique blend of architectural treasures, ambiance, food and entertainment
not casino gambling. And while casino officials felt that the large tourism market would
insure the casino’s success the fact that New Orleans is such a tourist attraction worked
9to the casino’s disadvantage says Gary Reed, a gaming stock analyst with Hattier,
Sanford and Reynoir. There are too many other things in the city that people want to
do that pull them away from the casino experience (Bowser 1995).  
Many felt that the casino's poor performance was a result of the temporary
casino’s location, which is not on a major tourist route. Location would seem to be a
factor in the collapse of the River City Casino complex as well. The complex is just
upriver from downtown New Orleans on a 50-acre tract of land surrounded by vacant
warehouses and abandoned buildings in what is considered a high crime area. Though
not readily accessible by tourists, the River City Casino complex did not provide
shuttles to transport tourists from the major hotels and Convention Center.
Additionally, because of its isolated location foot traffic was nonexistent. Without
patrons, the riverboat casinos could not generate enough revenue to remain
economically viable. 
While the temporary casino’s location may not have been considered desirable,
the permanent casino was being constructed on a prime piece of real estate in the heart
of the downtown. With its location adjacent to major tourist attractions that see
significant number of tourists on foot many felt this would allow the casino to generate
the kinds of revenues predicted by gambling experts. 
According to Michael Soll, a gaming analyst with Urban Systems, Inc. in New
Orleans, preliminary market data gathered by both the regulators and casino operators
would have helped determine placement of the riverboat casinos as well as the expected
participation of tourists and locals in gambling (Bowser 1995). Early indications of the
casino industry's performance would suggest that market projections for New Orleans
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were greatly exaggerated by casino experts. Because the licenses were given out largely
on a political basis rather than a market demand basis, neither the Riverboat Gaming
Commission nor the Louisiana Economic Development Commission conducted market
research to determine how best to distribute positions around the state. With experts
predicting an endless stream of revenue, casino developers competed vigorously for a
slice of the gambling pie. As a result, the New Orleans gambling market reached the
saturation point very quickly. Circus Circus of Las Vegas, believing that the economic
indicators did indeed prove industry saturation, halted construction of its riverboat
casino and abandoned plans to open a riverboat casino in Chalmette, a suburb south of
New Orleans. Before the Louisiana Gaming Commission could revoke Circus Circus
gambling license, Circus Circus voluntarily relinquished it to state authorities.
As Harrah’s temporary casino continued to experience discouraging revenue
returns in September and October of 1995, the question of Harrah’s financial solvency
became a major concern of city and state officials. In early November, financial
projections for the casino were so grave that it was felt the company would not be able
to meet its debt even after the permanent casino opened. It was during this time that
Fred Cassibry, a member of the state casino board, alleged that Harrah’s had retained
the services of a law firm specializing in bankruptcies. Harrah’s denied these
allegations. However, on Wednesday, November 22, Harrah’s Casino New Orleans
shut down the temporary casino, halted construction of the permanent casino and filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This latest action by Harrah’s added 2500 casino workers
and 800 construction workers to the unemployment roles.
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While New Orleans is the first major American city to implement legalized
gaming as a tool for economic development, there are smaller communities with
legalized gaming in place that are realizing substantial economic benefit. Deadwood,
South Dakota and Central City, Colorado are two such communities. One reason for
their success is that the constitutional amendments enacting legalized gaming were
carefully worded to establish limits on gaming that would not adversely affect the
historic character of the communities (Ittelson 1995). Before the advent of legalized
gaming, each of the communities was a historic mining town with a significant
inventory of historic buildings and a modest summer tourism industry. Due to
inadequate private and public capital, each community had reached a deteriorated
physical state. With the introduction of gambling, their economies have turned around.
By establishing well-defined goals for casino revenues, some of the monies have been
channeled into the downtown. The result has been that most of the historic buildings
in the commercial districts have been rehabilitated. The gaming industry has become
the major economic force for the local economy and the community’s physical
development.
As a catalyst for economic development in New Orleans, gambling has yet to
prove itself. New Orleans’ city government is now facing a $24 million budget deficit
for 1996 because of money that was anticipated from gambling revenues. Another
financial consideration is the guaranteed $1.25 million annual payment from the casino
to retire a 30-year bond issue by the city. This bond issue is to pay for the extra police,
fire and sanitation services required for the opening of the casino. Seen by many as a
victory by Mayor Marc Morial in requiring the casino to offset direct costs to the city,
12
it could turn out to be a victory on the part of the casino. City hall and Harrah's made
an agreement with the proviso that, if revenues for the permanent casino ever fell below
$400 million in any year, Harrah's would be relieved of its financial obligation. With
analysts predicting $398 million in revenues in the first full year of operation, the
agreement may well be worthless. The state is also expecting a $50 million shortfall in
its 1996 budget. The expected $50 million revenue from the state's casinos may not be
forthcoming because of their lackluster performance. While state officials say this is
only a fraction of the state's multi-billion dollar budget, it will mean some services may
not be funded. 
Casinos As Economic Development Catalysts
While direct financial support from casino revenues is one way to promote
economic development by the city, economic fallout from the casino locations is
another. Economic investment by Harrah's in the area adjacent to the temporary site in
the city's Municipal Auditorium could have served as a catalyst for economic
reinvestment by local businessmen, developers and entrepreneurs in the adjacent North
Rampart Street and Faubourg Tremé neighborhood area (see Figure 1).
North Rampart Street was originally the boundary of the old city of New
Orleans. In the early 19th century an area "back of town" was settled by free people of
color and named Faubourg Tremé. North Rampart Street separated the Tremé
neighborhood from the French Quarter. Over time, North Rampart Street grew into a
bustling avenue. It was this avenue that witnessed the birth of jazz in New Orleans.
Today, the avenue reflects its declining condition and is a mere shadow of its former
13
self, with shuttered and boarded up storefronts and underutilized and deteriorating
property. Architecturally, North Rampart Street presents a melange of structures dating
from 1828 to the present, ranging in styles that include Greek Revival, Federal,
Italianate and Victorian. 
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When site selection for the temporary casino seemed to center on the Municipal
Auditorium, the City Planning Commission conducted a land use study of the North
Rampart Street area. Many felt that the presence of the new casino would serve as a
catalyst for new commercial development along the North Rampart Street corridor. The
land use study was seen as a way to control unwanted development and facilitate
development compatible with the character of the area. However, no goals were
developed involving either direct investment in the area by Harrah's or use of casino
revenues to facilitate projects that would impact the surrounding area. As a result, no
appreciable economic redevelopment has occurred to date. It is the city's misfortune
that an excellent opportunity to leverage casino revenues into an economically
depressed section of the city was missed.
It is important to remember that legalized gambling is a means to an end.
Leveraging the economic benefits of gambling casinos is the key. In cities that have an
existing tourism base and a historic downtown that satisfies a retail and entertainment
function, the introduction of legalized gaming adds a third market segment. Each of
these segments vies for the same expendable dollar. Channeling that dollar to benefit
the local economy is the reason gaming was legalized. 
This was what Natchez, Mississippi intended when they legalized gambling.
Natchez, like New Orleans, is a historic town whose economy had never fully
recovered from the oil-bust of the mid 80's. It, too, relied heavily on its tourism industry
to support its economy. As Natchez moved into the 90's, its economy was still
suffering. Under the guise of "riverfront development," gambling referenda were passed
legalizing dockside gambling. Promises of jobs were made to the citizens by casino
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proponents. Even the local Main Street Program forecast more business than downtown
merchants could imagine. In its monthly newsletter, the Natchez Convention and
Visitors Bureau described the onset of riverboat gambling as a dream come true.
In February  1993, the first casino opened on the riverfront at historic Natchez-
Under-the-Hill. Within a month of opening, downtown retailers and night spots
reported declining sales and loss of business. A business survey comparing pre-
gambling April 1992 with April 1993 showed that 71% of the retail businesses reported
a decrease in sales (Miller, "Gambling..." 1995). The initial decline in retail business
was due in part to the loss of the Delta Queen and Mississippi Queen, cruising
riverboats which lost the public dock to the casino. Hotels and motels have reported
little increase in business. Most of the casino visitors come from within a 50-mile radius
and rarely stay the night. Most restaurant owners agree that their establishments have
been adversely affected. Some restaurants have closed since the casino opened.
In an attempt to protect existing tourist industry interests in New Orleans and
prevent the above situation in New Orleans, the legislation authorizing the land-based
casino stipulated that the gambling casino could not include any hotel, entertainment,
or significant restaurant facilities. Some feel this contributed to the poor performance
of New Orleans casinos. The Mississippi Gulf Coast offers casinos with hotels,
restaurants, live entertainment, as well as recreational activities—all in an attempt to
attract more discriminating and larger volumes of customers. Casino proponents feel
that if the New Orleans casinos don't offer an entertainment experience that surpasses
those in Mississippi, then the New Orleans casinos will continue to perform poorly.
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Social Concerns Arise
While the economic issues are easy to measure, social issues associated with
casino gambling may not be as evident. The traditional arguments against legalized
gaming are that the activity is immoral and works against family and social values that
directly link reward to hard work; that gambling is inseparable from disrespect for the
law, political corruption and infiltration by organized crime; that it can lead to personal
and family tragedy from compulsive and pathological gaming behavior (Eadington
1995).
Since the first New Orleans casino opened in late 1993, Gamblers Anonymous
membership has increased by nearly 40% according to a spokesperson for the
organization. And while this represents a substantial increase in the number of
individuals held prisoner to compulsive gambling, the effects of compulsive gambling
on the family unit may not be as easy to quantify.
Corruption Becomes Part of the Game
New Orleans, as well as the state of Louisiana, has a long history of organized
crime and political corruption. It therefore comes as no surprise that the fledgling
gambling industry is fraught with shady dealings and widespread abuse. The video
poker business witnessed the indictment of eleven defendants on federal racketeering
charges involving Worldwide Gaming. Worldwide Gaming was granted the right to
serve as Bally Gaming's video poker machine distributor in early 1992. Linked to New
Orleans organized crime, the defendants pled guilty to running an illegal gambling
establishment and defrauding Bally Gaming out of more than $10 million.
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In early 1995, the FBI launched an investigation of Louisiana's gambling
industry focusing on whether state legislators received illegal gifts or favors from
gambling lobbyists. In the March legislative meeting, the members of the House of
Representatives overwhelmingly approved House Bill 2413 which was a local-option
initiative that would have allowed voters to close riverboat casinos and video poker
operations after a certain period. The bill, however, failed to emerge from the Senate
Judiciary B Committee, chaired by gambling proponent Senator Larry Bankston. After
much debate and heated discussion wherein House Bill 2413 was bounced back and
forth from the House to the Senate in various forms, the House voted to table the report
in its final hour of session.  The death of the bill and the possible role of campaign
contributions from gambling interests in this scenario prompted the federal
investigation (Wardlaw 1995). Occurring just a few weeks before election time, the
backlash of the federal investigation has been the retirement of Senator Larry Bankston
as well as a handful of other pro-gambling legislators prominently named in the FBI
report. The possibility of more resignations seems imminent as the federal investigation
continues.
 The future of gambling is presently at a critical juncture. During the
gubernatorial election in 1995, gambling became the primary issue of the race. The
issue of allowing voters to decide the fate of gambling in the state gained momentum
in the face of widespread corruption and political scandal. All seven major
gubernatorial candidates favored allowing voters to abolish video poker and riverboat
gambling. However, there was not a consensus among the candidates with regard to
allowing voters to decide the fate of New Orleans land-based casino. Also in the
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forefront of the governor’s race was the issue of campaign contributions from gambling
interests. Spawned as a result of the current FBI investigation , the gubernatorial
candidates were all in favor of passing legislation that would forbid any elected official
from accepting campaign contributions from gambling interests. With the election of
conservative Mike Foster as governor of Louisiana, his promise to allow the citizens
of the state to decide the fate of legalized gambling seems destined to become a reality.
Conclusion
The realities of gambling's economic impact on the city of New Orleans have been
nowhere near what has been anticipated. Information about other communities with
gambling in place, showing the possible adverse effects of legalized gambling on a
city's economy, appear to have been largely ignored by city and state officials. No local
analysis of the market share for gambling was conducted. Figures and projections
supplied by casino experts were taken at face value.  Even with projected revenue data
supplied by casino experts, the city did not develop any comprehensive long range
objectives to better regulate the industry and provide for structured economic
development utilizing casino revenues. It has been determined that planning is the key
to making gambling work to a city's advantage. Studies have shown that casinos have
the greatest economic impact in tourist areas with existing tourist infrastructures
(Eadington 1995).  Yet, as New Orleans proves, the presence of large numbers of
tourists does not guarantee success. A systematic approach to integrating gambling into
the city's economy may have proven more beneficial. The rapid proliferation of casinos
did create jobs in a depressed market, but because the implementation process was not
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carried out efficiently and effectively, more than 6100 jobs were lost. Many of the
problems New Orleans is experiencing have occurred in other gambling cities. They are
not unique. It would seem that the promises of economic salvation often cloud sound
judgment and reasoning.
What will happen in the future with casino gambling is unclear. The likelihood that
Louisiana voters will have the chance to decide its fate is uncertain. The reopening of
the temporary casino and a return to construction of the permanent casino is unclear.
Harrah’s is requesting concessions on the part of the city and state in an attempt to
lower their up-front costs. Both the city and state are hesitant to agree to any such
concessions until additional negotiations are conducted. If legislation is passed which
leads to the abolition of video poker and riverboat gambling, the land-based casino
would have a monopoly on the gambling market. Since Harrah's has a 30-year contract
with the state, any attempt by voters to abolish it would almost certainly result in
litigation. As a monopoly casino, it would have a much greater chance of succeeding
financially, and the city of New Orleans would realize financial reward as well.
New Orleans is still clinging to the hope that the casino will help alleviate its
financial problems. At present, however, the industry seems to be creating more
problems than it is solving. Public officials and private citizens are now realizing that
the decisions about legalized gambling should have been made based upon clearer goals
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